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Abstract
There is a mantra telling us that authentication is di cult The failure to design
robust authentication protocols is commonly attributed to a lack of good design
strategies and to a lack of verication tools We will argue that the problem is
rather confusion about the meaning of authentication If you do not know what you
are aiming for what hope is there in achieving it Imprecise and anthropomorphic
terminology does not help to clarify technical issues and confusion about the goals
of entity authentication has misled attempts to formalize this concept
Authenticating has a reputation of being an exceedingly awkward problem 
The following statement from  is a representative quote 
Many authentication protocols have been published and later found to con
tain subtle weaknesses or aws  Two factors contribute to this i	 the lack
of wellestablished guiding principles for protocol design
 and ii	 the use of
informal operational reasoning for protocol analysis 
Typically
 such a quote motivates the presentation of a new formalism for the
analysis of authentication protocols
 and the biggest prize to be won is the
detection of an attack hitherto unreported  We will argue that such exercises
in formal analysis more often add to the problem than help in its resolution 
Perceived problems with authentication are caused by intuitive but imprecise
interpretations of the objective of authentication
 and by neglecting to take
into account the environment a protocol is intended to operate in  In many
cases
 new attacks do not expose subtle aws in a protocol but dierences in
the assumptions about protocol goals 
Notation
P
X
and S
X
denote the public encryption key and the private signature key of
principal X
 n
X
denotes a nonce generated by X  Encryption of m under key
K is written as eKm	
 the digital signature of m under key K as sKm	 
c
   Published by Elsevier Science B V Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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  Entity Authentication
We concentrate on authentication protocols where a veri er checks the iden
tity of a claimant entity authentication	  We do not consider authentication
protocols that establish shared keys  We will examine dierent interpretations
of entity authentication and try to convince the reader that often the goals
of authentication change surreptitiously during the process of formalisation 
Informally
 the goal of an authentication protocol is to provide the communi
cating parties with some assurance about the others true identity   The
International Standard ISOIEC   interprets this statement without
reference to a session or a connection 
De nition  Entity authentication mechanisms allow the verication
 of
an entitys claimed identity
 by another entity  The authenticity of the entity
can be ascertained only for the instance of the authentication exchange 
This version of entity authentication may appear strange and is by deni
tion at odds with any view that treats authentication as a step performed at
the start of a session  Denition   may have emerged from an attempt to
isolate elementary security primitives
 but are there any applications requiring
identity verication for its own sake What could be the use of the following
simple unilateral oneway	 authentication protocol
  A  B eP
B
n
A
	
  B   A n
A
In this challengeresponse protocol
 a challenger verier	 A sends out a chal
lenge n
A
encrypted under the public key of responder claimant	 B  If A
receives the challenge back
 A has authenticated B  In this protocol
 B has
no evidence about whom it is replying to and could as well broadcast its re
sponse  Such a protocol may be used by a network controller to poll nodes
in the network and check their availability
 by a security company to check
whether a safe has been tampered with
 or by an operating system log on
scheme based on proximity smart card  In all cases
 the protocol prevents an
attacker from replying to challenges sent to devices that have failed
 or are no
longer present
 and thus deceiving the controller about the true state of the
device 
Entity authentication checks veries that the responder is alive at one
point during the protocol run	  There is
 however
 a second ISO denition of
entity authentication  
De nition  Peer entity authentication The corroboration that a peer
entity in an association is the one claimed  This service is provided for use at
the establishment of
 or at times during
 the data transfer phase of a connec
tion to conrm the identities of one or more of the entities connected to one
or more of the other entities 

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The two denitions given aim into dierent directions  Given this diver
gence of goals
 it should come as no surprise that research on entity authen
tication has been somewhat out of focus  To complete the picture
 we add a
denition of entity authentication from a paper that introduced the view of
authentication as a correspondence property  
De nition  Whenever one of the parties completes an execution of the
protocol
 it marks the execution as either accepted in case of successful au
thentication	 or rejected  The intention is that executions marked as accepted
correspond to runs of the protocol that denitely involved the intended other
party 
This denition explains reasonably well how the goal of Denition  
may be achieved in practice  Still
 the meaning of involved remains open to
interpretation
 as we will see later  We also have to proceed cautiously when
dening protocol goals in terms of completed executions errorfree protocol
runs	  
An errorfree history of the protocol runs between A and B is one in which
all of the executions accepted by both parties      match exactly onetoone 
Errors in a protocol run can be due to an attack or to a communications
failure  Description as the following make no distinction between attacks and
protocol runs aborted for some other reason 
The attackers objective is to cause A or B to erroneously mark one of these
perverted protocol runs as accepted
 even though it does not match with
any execution accepted by the other party 
This statement is stronger than suggested by Denition  
 where the in
tended other party had to be involved in the protocol run
 but did not have
to accept the protocol run  An attacker could achieve this goal simply by
suppressing the last message in a regular protocol run  This can be described
as a broken connection but hardly as a broken protocol  In general
 we have
to avoid classifying any action by a third party as an attack  In a network
most communications require contributions from intermediate nodes so the
fact that such a node was involved in a protocol run accepted by one party
or both	 does not necessarily constitute an attack 
      a third party can always act as a simple delaying relay between the
two parties without being considered an attacker  Indeed
 such delaying is
no dierent and is indistinguishable from what any network switch does in
normal operation  
As a matter of fact
 it depends very much on the model of communications
whether an action by a third party can be regarded to be malicious  We will
now demonstrate this point by looking at attacks both in the setting of a
circuitswitched and a packetswitched network 

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 Two Attacks
To explore the diculties in analysing entity authentication protocols
 two
attacks and their interpretation will be discussed in some detail  In particular

we assess the claim that mutual authentication is inherently dierent from
unilateral authentication in both directions  
 The Canadian Attack
The Canadian Attack is directed at a protocol considered at one stage  for
inclusion in ISOIEC 
 the International Standard for authentication
mechanisms using a public key algorithm  This protocol
 somewhat simplied

works as follows 
  A  B n
A
  B   A n
B
 A n
A
 sS
B
n
B
 A n
A
	
  A  B n
 
A
 B n
B
 sS
A
n
 
A
 B n
B
	
Entity A intentionally does not reuse its challenge n
A
in the third message
to avoid signing a string which is partly dened
 and fully known in advance

by B  This protocol survived in a few revisions of ISOIEC 
 until an
attack was found by the Canadian member body of ISO  see also 
	
  EA	  B n
A
  B   EA	 n
B
 A n
A
 sS
B
n
B
 A n
A
	
  EB	  A n
B
  A  EB	 n
 
A
 B n
B
 sS
A
n
 
A
 B n
B
	
  EA	  B n
 
A
 B n
B
 sS
A
n
 
A
 B n
B
	
The description of the attack concludes with the remark B now believes to
be connected to A
 and the eect of the attack is summarised as follows 
An intruder who has initiated a session with B can initiate another session
with A and so obtain a signature suitable for use in responding to B  In this
way
 the intruder can successfully masquerade as A in his session with B 
B
 
n
A

n
B
 A n
A
 sS
B
n
B
 A n
A
	
 
n
 
A
 B n
B
 sS
A
n
 
A
 B n
B
	












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B
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n
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
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

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
A
Fig  The Canadian attack in a circuitswitched network

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In a circuitswitched network Figure 	
 B has a connection with E but
receives a message that misleads B into believing that the connection is with
A  This message had previously been sent by A on another connection  The
intruder has succeeded in deceiving B about the identity of the entity at the
other end of a connection  Here
 mutual authentication of a single connection
is not the same as unilateral authentication of two separate connections 
B
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Pq
n
A
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Pi
n
B
 A n
A
 sS
B
n
B
 A n
A
	
E









n
B
 
n
 
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B
 sS
A
n
 
A
 B n
B
	
A
Fig 	 The Canadian attack in a packetswitched network
In a packetswitched network
 E masquerades as A by intercepting a mes
sage from A to B
 and forwarding this very message to the intended recipient
B  Evidently
 E achieves the same eect by doing nothing and letting mes
sage  pass to B Figure 	  The attack leaves A with an incomplete protocol
run with B  B expects a message formed using As private signature key and
its own challenge n
B
  The message sent by A in step  and forwarded by E
in step  fully meets this criterion so no breach has occurred 
In a packetswitched network
 there are no connections to authenticate
and we have to look further for authentication properties violated by the
Canadian attack  Let us thus consider Denition    B accepts the protocol
run and concludes that A has been authenticated
 whilst the intention of
an authentication protocol is that executions marked as accepted correspond
to runs of the protocol that de nitely involved the intended other party The
party A was indeed involved in this protocol run  It had to serve as an
oracle for the intruder  It then depends on the way we match protocol runs
correspondence	 how the Canadian attack should be classied 

There is a match because B issues an encrypted challenge n
B
and A replies
by signing the challenge  Hence
 there is no attack 

There is a mismatch because B replies to a challenge n
A
that was not
issued by A  Hence
 there is an attack
 essentially because we declare that
it matters who starts a protocol run 
If the attackers objective is to cause A or B to erroneously mark one of these
perverted protocol runs as accepted even though it does not match with any
execution accepted by the other party
 then we denitely face an attack  How
ever
 as mentioned above
 such an interpretation classies communications
failures as security violations 
 An Attack against the NeedhamSchroeder Publickey Protocol
The simplied	 NeedhamSchroeder public key protocol uses a public key en
cryption algorithm to encrypt challenges with the receivers public key  

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This way
 the intended receiver must process the challenge before it can be
come available to anyone else 
  A  B eP
B
n
A
 A	
  B   A eP
A
n
A
 n
B
	
  A  B eP
B
n
B
	
Lowe found an attack on the NeedhamSchroeder public key protocol 


while postulating the following protocol goals 
The initiator commits to a session only if the responder is indeed present
and taking part in the protocol  The responder B commits to a session with
the initiator A only if A is indeed trying to connect with B  
This denition explicitly states that the responder veries the source of the
challenge it replied to
 rather than the source of the reply to its own challenge 
Formally
 the authentication conditions for initiator and responder are
signalRunningINIT A B n
A
 n
B
  signalCommitRESP B A n
A
 n
B
signalRunningRESP E A n
A
 n
B
  signalCommitINIT A E n
A
 n
B
Lowe concludes that the protocol meets the rst goal while it is possible
for an attacker to violate the second goal   Figure  shows such an attack
in a circuitswitched network  After step 
 the responder B commits to a
protocol run with A although A was running the protocol with E
 in violation
of the responders authentication specication 
B
 
  eP
B
n
A
 A	

  eP
A
n
B
 n
A
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  eP
B
n
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Fig 
 Lowes attack in a circuitswitched network
It is interesting to check why the specication for the initiator is satised in
this attack  The event signalRunningRESP E A n
A
 n
B
is signaled at step 

where the enemy intercepts a message from B intended for A
 and forwards
this very message unchanged to A  Indeed
 in circuitswitched terms and in
the spirit of Denition  
 A and B have connections with E
 but only As
connection is authentic 
In a packetswitched network
 A cannot determine the origin of the mes
sage eP
A
n
A
 n
B
	  A maninthemiddleattack becomes a triangle attack
without a place for inserting an event signalRunningRESP E A  Now
 in
tercepting this message is not necessary for the attack to succeed
 but for
verication to succeed  The enemy E fakes the interception
 not the message 
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Fig  Lowes attack in a packetswitched network
Even more peculiarly
 the event signalRunningRESP E A n
A
 n
B
includes the
value n
B

 which is not known to the intruder E at that time  Thus
 a proof
based on this event would argue that the party E is authenticated because it
intercepted a message whose content remains partially unknown to it
 rather
than because it had used its private key to decrypt As initial challenge 
 
These remarks point to a fundamental problem  To capture authentication

an articial channel and articial events were introduced  Rules for inserting
these events have to be chosen with utmost caution and are an easy source
for the kind of abnormalities just noted  In many ways
 the introduction of
these articial events resembles idealization in the BAN logic  Both translate
informal concepts into a formal framework
 and in both cases errors can occur
during translation 
Considering Denition  
 note that A starts a protocol run with E
 and
E is indeed active during the attack as it has to decrypt As message to obtain
the challenge n
A
  Hence
 As commit can be regarded valid as it is preceded by
an action by E  PartyB executes a protocol run with A
 and A is indeed active
during the attack as it has to decrypt Bs message to obtain the challenge n
B
 
Hence
 Bs commit is valid as it is preceded by an action by A 
	 Do You Think Circuitswitched or Packetswitched

The two examples given have a common theme  In a circuitswitched network

we can draw conclusions about the entities we are connected to
 and it is
intuitively clear why both attacks violate security  Peer entity authentication
 Denition  	 has failed  In a circuitswitched network
 to masquerade
as another party the attacker sends messages on a connection the receiver
associates with the party impersonated  We can be vague about the meaning
of identities in these explanations 
In a packetswitched network
 the two attacks count when it matters who
starts a protocol run  There are no connections to authenticate
 terms like
identity
 masquerade
 or impersonate need precise denitions
 and being con
nected to or knowing whom you are talking to evoke a wrong communica
tions paradigm  A postman delivering a letter is hardly masquerading as the
sender  In this setting
 Denition   is more appropriate
 and verifying a
claimed identity should be rephrased as checking whether an entity is alive 
 
We encounter a familiar problem in the analysis of cryptographic protocols  How are
messages modeled that contain encrypted elds whose content is not known to the sender

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 A History of Formal Denitions
We will now track how entity authentication has been captured in formal
denitions  Denition   serves as the starting point for our historic survey 
The denition in  follows the lead given by 

 again requiring protocol
runs to match and giving a precise denition of matching protocol runs 
De nition  Two records of a run match if their messages can be parti
tioned into sets of matching messages each set containing one message from
each record	
 the messages originated by one participant appear in the same
order in both records
 and the messages originated by the other participant
appear in the same order in both records 
De nition  A run of an authentication protocol is successful if the fol
lowing two properties hold

Both Alice and Bob accept each others identities 

If Alice and Bob have recorded their exchange
 then their records of the run
will match 
These denitions
 and the attack presented in 
 raise familiar issues 
Protocol runs can fail because of an attack or because of a communications
failure  Thus
 we need denitions that allow for incomplete protocol runs so
there cannot be a complete match between all messages	 and only asks for a
match between certain crucial events in the protocol runs  Denition   is
certainly sucient to reach the original informal objectives of authentication

but it is by no means necessary  It may be convenient when verifying proto
cols in a formalism that models protocol executions
 but at the same time it
becomes more dicult to justify why an incorrect execution amounts to an
attack  Reference  comments on this problem 	
The next to explore the concept of matching protocol runs were Woo and
Lam   In their model
 each participant in a protocol run executes a local
program  Protocol runs match if correspondence between certain steps in the
local executions can be established  The high level denition of authentication

i e  to be ascertained of the identity of the authenticated principal
 is familiar
and uncontroversial  The added explanation
upon successful termination of protocol execution
 an authenticating prin
cipal should be assured that it is talking to the principal it has in mind
is dangerously anthropomorphic
 or connectionoriented  In a network
 mes
sages pass through several intermediaries
 which may legitimatelymodify parts
of the message  When a party receives a message
 is it then talking to
the originator of the message or to the last intermediary that delivered the
message At a technical level
 correspondence captures the fact that the au
thenticated party has to participate in a successful run of an authentication
protocol 

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Informally
 correspondence means that the execution of the dierent prin
cipals in an authentication protocol proceeds in a lockstepped fashion  In
particular
 when an authenticating principal nishes its part of the protocol

the authenticated principal must have been present and participated in its
part of the protocol 
This statement is ambiguous  The rst sentence suggests very stringent re
quirements on the executions performed by the principals
 resembling canon
ical intensional specications see Section 	  Authentication is treated as a
complex dance where both parties have to synchronize their movements very
precisely  The second sentence relaxes the conditions and restates the original
informal goal of authentication 
Frequently
 authentication properties are expressed as beliefs  At rst
glance
 it seems natural to ask that the beliefs formed by the verier and by
the responder are in agreement 
De nition  We say that a protocol correctly achieves authentication if
whenever an agent A accepts the identity of another agent B
 it must be the
case then B believes that he has been running the protocol with A
 and the
records of the messages sent and received at the two ends should match 
On second thoughts
 this denition does not capture authentication very
well  To verify the claimants identity one does not have to verify the claimants
beliefs

  The fact that A wants to corroborate Bs identity does not imply
at all that B has to know whom it is responding to  In most unilateral
authentication protocols the responder has no evidence about the veriers
identity  Furthermore
 as noted in Section  in a typical threestep authenti
cation protocol the responder can verify the claimants identity only after the
last message has arrived
 at which stage the verier has already authenticated
the responder  Hence
 the above condition cannot be met unless the commu
nications system guarantees message delivery  The denition of intensional
specications in  takes care to avoid this particular pitfall Section 	 
The example of the stationtostation protocol  may illustrate some of
the problems with Denition    This protocol aims to establish a shared
session key K  g
xy
mod p between two parties A and B  Here
 p is a
suitably chosen prime and g an integer of large multiplicative order modulo p
The steps in the protocol are as follows 
  A  B AB g
x
  B   A BA g
y
 eKsS
B
g
y
 g
x
		
  A  B AB eKsS
A
g
x
 g
y
		

This particular piece of requirement creep was probably caused when the authors of the
BAN logic decided to pronounce the symbol j  as believes which encouraged others to
reason about beliefs agents form about the beliefs of other agents 

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The attack found in  interleaves two protocol runs
 marked by  and 

where the messages from A to B are intercepted by the intruder E
   A  EB	 AB g
x
   E   B EB g
x
   B   E BE g
y
 eKsS
B
g
y
 g
x
		
   EB	  A BA g
y
 eKsS
B
g
y
 g
x
		
   A  EB	 AB eKsS
A
g
x
 g
y
		
The records of the protocol runs at A and B do not match  In this sense

there is an attack  However
 A believes to execute the run with B  After
message  
 A associates the keyK with B
 and B and A are indeed the only
parties in possession of this key  Party B is left with the incomplete run
 so
B cannot yet associate the key K with any party  The only dierence to an
incomplete protocol run where the last message does not arrive lies in the yet
unconrmed value of the challengers identity in the responders local state 
There is a similar attack against the KSL protocol where the intruder
makes A and B establish a shared key not known to the intruder	 while both
act as responders in their protocol run with the intruder   At the end of the
attack
 both parties share a secret key with the party they believe to share a
key with
 but both believe that the other initiated the protocol run  It remains
doubtful whether these two attacks violate any practical authentication goals 
In 
 Lowe presents a hierarchy of specications for authentication that
capture dierent avours of Denition    There is again the suggestion that
to verify an agents identity one has to verify that agents beliefs
An authentication protocol is designed to assure an agent A as to the iden
tity of the other agent B with whom A is running the protocol therefore

in most cases A should be at least assured that B thought he was running
the protocol with A 
In this hierarchy
 agreement is the strongest form of authentication 
De nition  We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiatorA agreement
with a responder B on a set of data items ds if
 wheneverA acting as initiator	
completes a run of the protocol
 apparently with responder B
 then B has
previously been running the protocol
 apparently with A
 and B was acting
as a responder in his run
 and the two agents agreed on the data values of all
the variables in ds
 and each run of A corresponds to a unique run of B 
In summary
 the two main concepts for formalizing entity authentication
are state and correspondence agreement  Before assessing the usefulness of
these concepts
 we add the distinction between extensional specications and
intensional specications to our portfolio of denitions 

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 Extensional and Intensional Specications
The distinction between extensional specications
 which seek to establish
what is achieved by the protocol without making detailed analyses of the ac
tual communications nodes have sent
 and intensional specications which
concentrate on checking that the designers expectations about these commu
nications are justied is due to Roscoe   It is suggested
 perhaps somewhat
optimistically
 that the designers of a protocol know what they are doing
 and
that a protocol achieves its objectives when all steps are executed in the in
tended order  This leads to the following canonical intensional speci cation
De nition  A very natural specication we might want a protocol to
satisfy is that no node can believe a protocol run has completed unless a correct
series of messages has occurred consistent as to all the various parameters	
up to and including the last message the given node communicates 
Designers certainly assume that a protocol meets its stated objectives if it
is executed between honest participants without interference by an intruder 
Equally
 it is suspicious if a party can be persuaded to complete a protocol run
in circumstances where the intended correspondent did not act according to
the rules of the protocol
 for whatever reason  Such violations of an intensional
specication deserve to be examined more closely
 but they do not necessarily
constitute an attack
 a point that is repeatedly stressed in 
the main weakness is that it an intensional specication tells us nothing
in any abstract sense about what the protocol does 
Strictly speaking
 only violations of extensional specications merit the name
attack  A nice example for a violation of an intensional specication that can
be described as an attack only with a great stretch of imagination is given in
  In this attack
 entityA starts to run the NeedhamSchroeder public key
protocol with itself  The enemy replays As rst message to A
 convincing A
that it had received a reply to its own challenge
 which it had issued to itself 
Successful verication of an intensional specication conrms that a pro
tocol can only be used in the manner intended by its designers
 not that it
achieves the abstract goals they intended  It is thus natural to conclude that
      they intensional specications provide a separate criterion for judging
a protocol to the more abstract extensional specications one may be able
to invent and should not be thought of as a substitute
 except perhaps in
the area of authentication 
Notably
 authentication is listed as a possible exception to the general rule  It
is tempting to employ intensional specications in a formal analysis
 because
they can be formulated in various process calculi in a straightforward fashion

see  for an example
 and one does not have to think about a more ab
stract deeper	 meaning of authentication  However
 reasonable extensional
denitions of entity authentication exist and should be used 

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 Entity Authentication Revisited
The previous sections gave a brief historic survey of the intuitive associations
evoked by the term authentication
 and of the various attempts to capture it
formally  Our investigations point out some major shortcomings 

Communications can fail  The sender of the last message commits without
knowing whether it arrived 

The attacks described are meaningful in circuitswitched networks but not
in packetswitched networks 

Specications of protocol goals that keep more state than the protocol de
scription itself can hardly claim to match the designers intentions 

When explaining attacks or detailing protocol goals
 authors sometimes
deviate from their original authentication goals without accounting for the
discrepancies they introduce  
In short
 the current view of authentication is dominated by authentication
between people
 e g  Alice wants to talk to Bob
 as seen by human observers 
Protocol steps A  B  m are subconsciously interpreted within the context
of connectionoriented communications systems  Perceived problems with mu
tual authentication are not clearly articulated  Can concepts like state and
correspondence help to capture entity authentication formally in a framework
geared towards cryptographic protocols run by machines that is independent
of the underlying communications system
 Correspondence
Using correspondence to specify authentication
 we can deal properly with
incomplete protocol runs and be precise about the variables the participants
should agree on in a valid protocol run  Depending on the choice of authen
ticating message
 Lowes attack Section  	 is a protocol run where none of
the parties
 only the responder
 only the claimant
 or both parties are prop
erly authenticated Figure 	  All choices are plausible in their own way
 but
they lead to very dierent conclusions about the security of an authentication
protocol 
initiator A by responder B responder E by initiator A
no A  B  eP
B
n
A
 A	 yes E   A  eP
A
n
A
 	
no A  B  eP
B
n
B
	 no E   A  eP
A
n
A
 n
B
	
yes A  X  eP
X
n
B
	 yes E   X  eP
E
n
A
 A	
Fig  Authentication properties holding in Lowes attack
Given the wide range of options of authenticating messages
 we can hardly
claim to have claried the meaning of authentication  As a matter of fact
 cor

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respondence plasters over the fundamental dierence between Denitions  
and    Correspondence properties can be used to show that a party was
alive
 but equally well to show that protocol executions match 
 State
Denition  
 for example
 gives an intensional specication of authentication

phrased so closely in terms of the details of its execution that the execution
itself appears as the main reason for running an authentication protocol 
The artefact the protocol	 has taken over from the original purpose and
imposed its own requirements 
Even worse
 whilst protocol designers strive to limit the amount of state par
ticipants have to keep
 this denition introduces new state components and
explains authentication in terms of these articial components  In the proto
col of the Canadian attack
 B does not store the value n
A
locally
 and stores
n
B
only between steps  and   Why should the success of a protocol run be
judged on the basis of a data item B does not remember store	 at the end
of its protocol run By introducing state into the specication of entity au
thentication
 we have actually introduced connections through the backdoor 
	 Identity
Authentication protocols verify claimed identities  Thus
 we should deter
mine the operations the authenticated party has to perform to prove its iden
tity  To do that
 we nally have to declare what we mean by identity  In
cryptographic protocols
 the translation of identity into cryptographic key
is quite natural  We follow ISOIEC  
 the International Standard
on entity authentication using a public key algorithm
 which states
De nition  In the authentication mechanisms specied in this part of
ISOIEC  an entity to be authenticated corroborates its identity by
demonstrating its knowledge of its secret signature key  This is achieved by the
entity using its signature to sign specic data  The signature can be veried
by anyone using the entitys public verication key 
The authenticated message should thus be linked to the operation demon
strating knowledge of the claimants private key  Protocol descriptions like to
focus on the message exchange
 but cryptographic keys are actually used in
computations by the local programs  It is thus important that our abstract
model considers all aspects of a protocol execution
 and we could add specic
ApplyKey events to our formal model
 or associate these events with suitable
protocol messages  When using symmetric encryption or digital signatures

these events may be tied to messages on transmit channels in the CSP model
of   In protocols employing public key encryption
 messages on receive
channels capture exercise of the private key directly 

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 Origin of Challenge
In oneway authentication
 the claimant is not expected to verify the verier
and will not check the origin of the challenge  In mutual authentication
 both
parties act as veriers  Hence
 one may be persuaded to check not only the
origin of replies but also the origin of challenges  This new condition
 which is
implicitly used but not explicitly stated in  may have its justications but
they are not given  We have a typical case of requirement creep  Identifying
circumstances where the origin of challenges has to be veried remains an
interesting challenge  However
 in general it is not good security practice to
ask for as much as possible  Overprotection can reduce actual security 
Also
 the fact that the initiator was present at the start of the protocol
run does not imply that the initiator replied to the responders challenge
 as
shown by an attack against the full NeedhamSchroeder public key protocol
found by Meadows   The attack assumes that entities do not distinguish
between names and nonces  A starts a protocol run with B
 which is taken
over by the enemy before A replies to Bs challenge  A still has to decrypt Bs
challenge
 but does so in another protocol run  The attack works as follows
   A  S  B
   S   A  P
B
 B sS
S
P
B
 B	
   A  B  eP
B
n
A
 A	
   B   S  A
   S   B  P
A
 A sS
S
P
A
 A	
   B   EA	 eP
A
n
A
 n
B
	
   E   A  eP
A
n
A
 n
B
	
   A  ES	 n
B
   EA	  B eP
B
n
B
	
 Conclusion
In the early s
 an opinion emerged claiming that mutual authentication
was more than unilateral authentication in both directions  We have described
two of the attacks that purport to support this claim and noted that these
attacks
 and their explanations
 are quite convincing in the context of circuit
switched networks but much less so in packetswitched networks  This opinion
was formally captured in denitions that required the protocol participants to
have matching states during the protocol execution 


  Such denitions
are not too far away from the canonical intensional specications proposed in
  They have also inuenced the denitions used by Bellare and Rogaway
in their verication of authentication protocols  
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It is not too far fetched to conclude that the originators of the chain of in
vestigations we have examined thought in terms of circuitswitched networks 
Mutual authentication of a single connection is materially dierent from uni
lateral authentication of two separate connections  In the attempt to capture
this fact
 denitions were coined that capture the essence of a connection
much better than the verication of a claimed identity  Authentication pro
tocols may well be used to establish a connection  Still
 this does not imply
that they should simulate a connection 
In the process of standardisation
 ISOIEC JTCSC drafted Deni
tion  
 expressing entity authentication without reference to connections 
Yet the Canadian attack
 which is explained in the language of connections

came out of this very committee  Peer entity authentication Denition  	
emerged from ISOTC SC  Despite its explicit reference to associations
sessions
 connections	
 this denition fails to appreciate the importance of
naming individual connections  By taking a default connection for granted

one sometimes overlooks its existence
 and importance 
In a circuitswitched network
 authenticating connections is a reasonable
endeavour and answers the question Who speaks on this connection  If
this is the goal
 we should explicitly identify the connection that is being
authenticated  As stated in 
 for A to assert channel C speaks for A it
must be able to name C  Presently
 connections lurk beneath the surface but
terms like impersonate and masquerade really need their presence  Further
assumptions are necessary to make such an authentication work 
i	 We have to know where the connection ends  Entity authentication checks
who is at that end 
ii	 The entity to be authenticated is honest  Otherwise
 we face the paradox
of Lowes analysis and authenticate a party based on data it has not seen 
Are there examples where it matters who starts the run of an authentica
tion protocol Are there delicate diplomatic situations where parties refuse to
make the rst move but are happy to respond Is there pride in cyberspace
Maybe
 conciliator is a more apt description for an attacker who manages to
make two parties talk with each other that otherwise would not 
In general
 it is advisable to model the system before modeling the proto
col  Cryptographic operations and checks on incoming messages are important
steps in a protocol execution
 both for describing protocol goals and for de
fending against attacks  The discussion of unique session identiers in the
analysis of the IKE protocol makes interesting reading in this regard  
The model also has to describe the behaviour of principals  Protocol goals are
often formalized as if agents could engage in a protocol run only by following
the rules of the protocol  The triangle attack in Section   shows that an
agent can deviate from a protocol run and still allow the corresponding agent
to validly	 complete its run of the protocol  Insider attacks are a realistic
threat scenario for electronic commerce applications  
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